the true form of the motive for this expedition, in what respect was
that open to criticism? Far enough are we from going along with the
views of the Auckland cabinet at this juncture; but these two things we
are sure of--that those views were unsound, not by any vice which has
yet been exposed, and that the vice alleged argues gross ignorance of
every thing oriental. Lord Auckland might err, as heavily we believe him
to have done, in his estimate of Affghanistan and the Affghan condition:
he had untrue notions of what the Affghans needed, and what it was that
they could bear: but his critics, Indian and domestic, were not in error
by default merely of philosophic views as to the state of society in
Affghanistan; they erred by want of familiarity with the most prominent
usages of eastern economy. Lord Auckland was wrong, only as whole masses
of politicians are wrong in Europe; viz. by applying European principles
to communities under feelings and prejudices systematically different.
But his antagonists were wrong as to palpable facts.

_Thirdly_, If we pass from the motive to the execution of the motive,
from the purpose to the means of effecting it, we are compelled to say
that Lord Auckland's government adopted for its primary means the most
extravagant that could have been devised; viz. the making itself a party
to the financial torture of the land.

_Fourthly_, When local insurrection had arisen, whether directed (as
every body assumes) against the abuses of a system introduced by
ourselves, or (as _we_ assert) proper to the land, and hereditary to the
morbid condition of Affghan society--we shall expose the feeble and
inadequate solution yet offered by any military guide for the tragical
issue of these calamities. Kohistan, or particular cases, need not
detain us; but, coming at once _in medias res_ as to Cabool itself, we
shall undertake to show, that as yet we have no true or rational account