three miles along their whole line, had taken 4000 prisoners,
including most of General Prentiss's brigade, had captured about
seventy pieces of artillery, according to their statement, had taken
an immense baggage-train, with vast quantities of commissary,
quartermaster's, and medical stores, and had driven Grant's forces
under the shelter of their gunboats. Had the battle ended here, the
victory would have been most triumphant for the Rebels. Generals
Bragg and Breckenridge urged that the battle should go on, that
Grant's force was terribly cut up and demoralized, that another hour
would take them all prisoners, or drive them into the river, and
that then the transport fleet of more than a hundred boats, would be
at the control of the Confederates, who could assume the offensive,
and in five days take Louisville. Other officers argued that half of
their own troops were disabled or scattered, that it would risk the
victory already gained to push the remainder of Grant's forces,
which now turned at bay, might make a desperate stand. They
estimated their own loss at ten or twelve thousand men, and knew
that many, thinking the battle was over, had left their commands and
were loading themselves with plunder, from the pockets of the dead
and the knapsacks lying over the field or found in the Federal
camps. Some expressed strong confidence that Price and Van Dorn
would arrive during the night, and the victory would be easily
completed on the morrow.

While this argument lasted, the men were resting, the hour passed
away, and night spread her sable pall over the scene.

The night was spent in removing the wounded, and as much of the
captured stores and artillery as possible; but horses and wagons
were scarce, and most of the stores and some wounded were left. The