A Philosophicall Essay for the Reunion of the Languages - Or, The Art of Knowing All by the Mastery of One by Pierre Besnier
page 22 of 32 (68%)
page 22 of 32 (68%)
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From the sound of words, I passe to their _signification_, which in the
same dialect may be call'd the soul of a word, as the sound is its body; to expresse it in other terms, then what seem to rellish the dry and unpleasant humour of the Pedant or Grammarian; I suppose that words being the expressions of our thoughts, and our thoughts the representations of objects, the different significations that are given to words, principally depend upon the various conceptions, that every Nation frames of the same objects, agreeable to what seems most neerly to concern it. This ingageth me to explaine the intire sequel, and naturall dependances of our Ideas, and the manner of their forming; of which the world hath yet receiv'd a very imperfect account. In order to this, you may understand what those objects are, of which we have proper Ideas, and what those are which we conceive by forreigne images, and that we do not name but in figurative terms; whence ariseth that alliance and resemblance of our Ideas, and why the greatest share of our words if refer'd to their first originall, are but metaphors which represent objects to us in such terms as are proper to another, with which it hath some agreement, or neere relation, and withall what are the grand principles of metaphors; either of Attribution or Proportion, that do not only make op the beauty, but almost the intire body of the Language. Our Ancestors that gave no names to things, but by a directing prudence, purposing to distinguish the works of Nature and Art, had an especiall regard to the naturall resemblance they had with any thing that was most known to them, and that was already distinguisht by its character, or to any one of their most prevailing properties, or to the principall action that distinguisht them from other beings. They made use of almost the same artifice, to impose names upon things more expressive of their properties, by considering them only with reference to their operations, of which they |
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