plainest reasons in the world) the right honorable gentleman has this
day thought fit totally to abandon. In the first place, he rejects the
authority of the Nabob of Arcot. It would, indeed, be pleasant to see
him adhere to this exploded testimony. He next, upon grounds equally
solid, abandons the benefits of that circulation which was to be
produced by drawing out all the juices of the body. Laying aside, or
forgetting, these pretences of his dispatch, he has just now assumed a
principle totally different, but to the full as extraordinary. He
proceeds upon a supposition that many of the claims may be fictitious.
He then finds, that, in a case where many valid and many fraudulent
claims are blended together, the best course for their discrimination is
indiscriminately to establish them all. He trusts, (I suppose,) as there
may not be a fund sufficient for every description of creditors, that
the best warranted claimants will exert themselves in bringing to light
those debts which will not bear an inquiry. What he will not do himself
he is persuaded will be done by others; and for this purpose he leaves
to any person a general power of excepting to the debt. This total
change of language and prevarication in principle is enough, if it stood
alone, to fix the presumption of unfair dealing. His dispatch assigns
motives of policy, concord, trade, and circulation: his speech proclaims
discord and litigations, and proposes, as the ultimate end, detection.

But he may shift his reasons, and wind and turn as he will, confusion
waits him at all his doubles. Who will undertake this detection? Will
the Nabob? But the right honorable gentleman has himself this moment
told us that no prince of the country can by any motive be prevailed
upon to discover any fraud that is practised upon him by the Company's
servants. He says what (with the exception of the complaint against the
Cavalry Loan) all the world knows to be true: and without that prince's
concurrence, what evidence can be had of the fraud of any the smallest