campaigning purposes, and could not be trusted. The Tugela formed the
ditch of a natural fortress covering Ladysmith. On its left bank rose an
almost continuous ridge or rampart from which the easy open ground on
the right bank could be watched for miles, and reconnaissances kept at a
distance.

Reconnaissances were, however, not needed to prove to Buller that
Colenso, where the railway passed up into the Tugela ridge, was immune
to a frontal attack, and that Ladysmith must be relieved by a turning
movement. Two alternatives offered themselves. The advance might be made
through Weenen and across the Tugela some distance below Colenso, and
thence to Elandslaagte, where the Boer line of communication with the
Transvaal might be cut; but to Ladysmith this was a circuitous route. It
also would necessitate the traversing of a rough bush country, into
which Buller was reluctant to throw raw troops just off the transports
who had not yet heard the sounds of war.

He therefore decided upon a westerly flank march by way of Potgieter's
Drift, twenty miles west of Colenso; and once on the left bank of the
Tugela he would be within a day's march of Ladysmith and the railway
into the Free State. White was heliographically consulted, and all the
arrangements for an advance on December 11 were made. The force had even
been set in motion when certain disturbing news came out of the west.
Gatacre had suffered a reverse at Stormberg, and simultaneously Methuen
had been roughly handled at Magersfontein, and was unable to continue
his march on Kimberley.

The strategic timidity of Buller and his curious habit of allowing
himself to be influenced by psychological probabilities were at once
apparent. The anticipated moral effect of these successes upon the enemy