without any due selection or subordination of parts. He is generally too
much on the stretch, and his manner has little variety. We cannot rest
upon, any of his works, though they contain observations which
occasionally discover a considerable insight into human nature. But his
doctrines, on the whole, are so inapplicable to real life and manners,
that we never dream of drawing from them any rule for laws or conduct,
or for fortifying or illustrating anything by a reference to his
opinions. They have with us the fate of older paradoxes:--

Cum ventum ad _verum_ est, _sensus moresque_ repugnant,
Atque ipsa utilitas, justi prope mater et æqui.

Perhaps bold speculations are more acceptable because more new to you
than to us, who have been, long since satiated with them. We continue,
as in the two last ages, to read, more generally than I believe is now
done on the Continent, the authors of sound antiquity. These occupy our
minds; they give us another taste and turn; and will not suffer us to be
more than transiently amused with paradoxical morality. It is not that I
consider this writer as wholly destitute of just notions. Amongst his
irregularities, it must be reckoned that he is sometimes moral, and
moral in a very sublime strain. But the _general spirit and tendency_ of
his works is mischievous,--and the more mischievous for this mixture:
for perfect depravity of sentiment is not reconcilable with eloquence;
and the mind (though corruptible, not complexionally vicious) would
reject and throw off with disgust a lesson of pure and unmixed evil.
These writers make even virtue a pander to vice.

However, I less consider the author than the system of the Assembly in
perverting morality through his means. This I confess makes me nearly
despair of any attempt upon the minds of their followers, through