by a machine; and at the same time attend to all other ideas, which are
connected with this by every kind of catenation; and combine or separate
them voluntarily for the purpose of obtaining some end.

For we can create nothing new, we can only combine or separate the ideas,
which we have already received by our perceptions: thus if I wish to
represent a monster, I call to my mind the ideas of every thing
disagreeable and horrible, and combine the nastiness and gluttony of a hog,
the stupidity and obstinacy of an ass, with the fur and awkwardness of a
bear, and call the new combination Caliban. Yet such a monster may exist in
nature, as all his attributes are parts of nature. So when I wish to
represent every thing, that is excellent, and amiable; when I combine
benevolence with cheerfulness, wisdom, knowledge, taste, wit, beauty of
person, and elegance of manners, and associate them in one lady as a
pattern to the world, it is called invention; yet such a person may
exist,--such a person does exist!--It is ---- ----, who is as much a
monster as Caliban.

4. In respect to consciousness, we are only conscious of our existence,
when we think about it; as we only perceive the lapse of time, when we
attend to it; when we are busied about other objects, neither the lapse of
time nor the consciousness of our own existence can occupy our attention.
Hence, when we think of our own existence, we only excite abstracted or
reflex ideas (as they are termed), of our principal pleasures or pains, of
our desires or aversions, or of the figure, solidity, colour, or other
properties of our bodies, and call that act of the sensorium a
consciousness of our existence. Some philosopher, I believe it is Des
Cartes, has said, "I think, therefore I exist." But this is not right
reasoning, because thinking is a mode of existence; and it is thence only
saying, "I exist, therefore I exist." For there are three modes of