few thousand to several hundred thousand. A large number crossed the
plains from the Western States, and many of them sought for farming
lands upon which to settle. To them a grant of land, leagues in extent,
seemed a monstrous wrong to which they could not be reconciled. The
vagueness, also, in many instances, of the boundaries of the land
claimed gave force and apparent reason to their objections. They
accordingly settled upon what they found unenclosed or uncultivated,
without much regard to the claims of the Mexican grantees. If the land
upon which they thus settled was within the tracts formerly occupied
by the grantees with their herds, they denied the validity of grants
so large in extent. If the boundaries designated enclosed a greater
amount than that specified in the grants, they undertook to locate the
supposed surplus. Thus, if a grant were of three leagues within
boundaries embracing four, the immigrant would undertake to appropriate
to himself a portion of what he deemed the surplus; forgetting that
other immigrants might do the same thing, each claiming that what he
had taken was a portion of such surplus, until the grantee was deprived
of his entire property.

When I was brought to consider the questions to which this condition
of things gave rise, I assumed at the outset that the obligations of
the treaty with Mexico were to be respected and enforced. This treaty
had stipulated for the protection of all rights of property of the
citizens of the ceded country; and that stipulation embraced inchoate
and equitable rights, as well as those which were perfect. It was not
for the Supreme Court of California to question the wisdom or policy
of Mexico in making grants of such large portions of her domain, or
of the United States in stipulating for their protection. I felt the
force of what Judge Grier had expressed in his opinion in the case
of The United States vs. Sutherland, in the 19th of Howard, that