The latter part of April on my first trip to the front I dined at Great
Headquarters (Grosse Haupt Quartier) in Charleville, France, with Major
Nicolai, Chief of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff.
The next day, in company with other correspondents, we were guests of
General von Moehl and his staff at Peronne. From Peronne we went to
the Somme front to St. Quentin, to Namur and Brussels. The soldiers
were enthusiastic and happy. There was plenty of food and considerable
optimism. But the confidence in victory was never so great as it was
immediately after the sinking of the _Lusitania_. That marked the
crisis in the future trend of the war.

Up to this time the people had heard very little about the fight
between the Navy and the Foreign Office. But gradually rumours spread.
While there was previously no outlet for public opinion, the
_Lusitania_ issue was debated more extensively and with more vigour
than the White Books which were published to explain the causes of the
war.

With the universal feeling of self confidence, it was but natural that
the people should side with the Navy in demanding an unrestricted
submarine warfare. When Admiral von Bachmann gave the order to First
Naval Lieutenant Otto Steinbrink to sink the Lusitania, he knew the
Navy was ready to defy the United States or any other country which
might object. He knew, too, that von Tirpitz was very close to the
Kaiser and could count upon the Kaiser's support in whatever he did.
The Navy believed the torpedoing of the Lusitania would so frighten and
terrorise the world that neutral shipping would become timid and enemy
peoples would be impressed by Germany's might on the seas. Ambassador
von Bernstorff had been ordered by the Foreign Office to put notices in