in the Central Powers joined forces with the Navy. The _Lusitania_
note was printed and the public discussion which resulted was greater
than that which followed the first declarations of war in August, 1914.
The people, who before had accepted everything their Government said,
began to think for themselves. One heard almost as much criticism as
praise of the _Lusitania_ incident. For the first time the quarrel,
which had been nourished between the Foreign Office and the Admiralty,
became nation-wide and forces throughout Germany lined up with one side
or the other. But the Navy Department was the cleverer of the two.
The press bureau sent out inspired stories that the submarines were
causing England a loss of a million dollars a week. They said that
every week the Admiralty was launching two U-boats. It was stated that
reliable reports to Admiral von Tirpitz proved the high toll taken by
the submarines in two weeks had struck terror to the hearts of English
ship-owners. The newspapers printed under great headlines: "Toll of
Our Tireless U-Boats," the names and tonnage of ships lost. The press
bureau pointed to the rise in food prices in Great Britain and France.
The public was made to feel a personal pride in submarine exploits.
And at the same time the Navy editorial writers brought up the old
issue of American arms and ammunition to further embitter the people.

Thus the first note which President Wilson wrote in the _Lusitania_
case not only brought the quarrel between the Navy and Foreign Office
to a climax but it gave the German people the first opportunity they
had had seriously to discuss questions of policy and right.

In the Rhine Valley, where the ammunition interests dominated every
phase of life, the Navy found its staunchest supporters. In
educational circles, in shipping centres, such as Hamburg and Bremen,
in the financial districts of Frankfort and Berlin, the Foreign Office