combine both motives to obedience but you cannot. The Prince must
remember that men are fickle, and love at their own pleasure, and that
men are fearful and fear at the pleasure of the Prince. Let him
therefore depend on what is of himself, not on that which is of others.
'Yet if he win not love he may escape hate, and so it will be if he does
not meddle with the property or women-folk of his subjects.' When he
must punish let him kill. 'For men will sooner forget the death of their
father than the loss of their estate.' And moreover you cannot always go
on killing, but a Prince who has once set himself to plundering will
never stop. This is the more needful because the only secure foundation
of his rule lies in his trust of the people and in their support. And
indeed again and again you shall find no more thorough democrat than
this teacher of tyrants. 'The people own better broader qualities,
fidelities and passions than any Prince and have better cause to show
for them.' 'As for prudence and stability, I say that a people is more
stable, more prudent, and of better judgment than a Prince.' If the
people go wrong it is almost certainly the crime or negligence of the
Prince which drives or leads them astray. 'Better far than any number of
fortresses is not to be hated by your people.' The support of the people
and a national militia make the essential strength of the Prince and of
the State.

[Sidenote: National Defence.]

The chapters on military organisation may be more conveniently
considered in conjunction with _The Art of War_. It is enough at present
to point out two or three observations of Machiavelli which touch
politics from the military side. To his generation they were entirely
novel, though mere commonplace to-day. National strength means national
stability and national greatness; and this can be achieved, and can only