The Economic Consequences of the Peace by John Maynard Keynes
page 47 of 243 (19%)
page 47 of 243 (19%)
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comparison between the terms of this understanding, on the basis of
which the German nation had agreed to lay down its arms, and the actual provisions of the document offered them for signature thereafter. The German commentators had little difficulty in showing that the draft Treaty constituted a breach of engagements and of international morality comparable with their own offense in the invasion of Belgium. Nevertheless, the German reply was not in all its parts a document fully worthy of the occasion, because in spite of the justice and importance of much of its contents, a truly broad treatment and high dignify of outlook were a little wanting, and the general effect lacks the simple treatment, with the dispassionate objectivity of despair which the deep passions of the occasion might have evoked. The Allied governments gave it, in any case, no serious consideration, and I doubt if anything which the German delegation could have said at that stage of the proceedings would have much influenced the result. The commonest virtues of the individual are often lacking in the spokesmen of nations; a statesman representing not himself but his country may prove, without incurring excessive blame--as history often records--vindictive, perfidious, and egotistic. These qualities are familiar in treaties imposed by victors. But the German delegation did not succeed in exposing in burning and prophetic words the quality which chiefly distinguishes this transaction from all its historical predecessors--its insincerity. This theme, however, must be for another pen than mine. I am mainly concerned in what follows, not with the justice of the Treaty,--neither with the demand for penal justice against the enemy, nor with the obligation of contractual justice on the victor,--but with its wisdom and with its consequences. |
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