as he likes.' 'Of course not: the very slaves have more liberty than he
has.' 'But how is this?' 'The reason is that he is not old enough.' 'No;
the real reason is that he is not wise enough: for are there not some
things which he is allowed to do, although he is not allowed to do others?'
'Yes, because he knows them, and does not know the others.' This leads to
the conclusion that all men everywhere will trust him in what he knows, but
not in what he does not know; for in such matters he will be unprofitable
to them, and do them no good. And no one will love him, if he does them no
good; and he can only do them good by knowledge; and as he is still without
knowledge, he can have as yet no conceit of knowledge. In this manner
Socrates reads a lesson to Hippothales, the foolish lover of Lysis,
respecting the style of conversation which he should address to his
beloved.

After the return of Menexenus, Socrates, at the request of Lysis, asks him
a new question: 'What is friendship? You, Menexenus, who have a friend
already, can tell me, who am always longing to find one, what is the secret
of this great blessing.'

When one man loves another, which is the friend--he who loves, or he who is
loved? Or are both friends? From the first of these suppositions they are
driven to the second; and from the second to the third; and neither the two
boys nor Socrates are satisfied with any of the three or with all of them.
Socrates turns to the poets, who affirm that God brings like to like
(Homer), and to philosophers (Empedocles), who also assert that like is the
friend of like. But the bad are not friends, for they are not even like
themselves, and still less are they like one another. And the good have no
need of one another, and therefore do not care about one another. Moreover
there are others who say that likeness is a cause of aversion, and
unlikeness of love and friendship; and they too adduce the authority of