The difficulty of the Charmides arises chiefly from the two senses of the
word (Greek), or temperance. From the ethical notion of temperance, which
is variously defined to be quietness, modesty, doing our own business, the
doing of good actions, the dialogue passes onto the intellectual conception
of (Greek), which is declared also to be the science of self-knowledge, or
of the knowledge of what we know and do not know, or of the knowledge of
good and evil. The dialogue represents a stage in the history of
philosophy in which knowledge and action were not yet distinguished. Hence
the confusion between them, and the easy transition from one to the other.
The definitions which are offered are all rejected, but it is to be
observed that they all tend to throw a light on the nature of temperance,
and that, unlike the distinction of Critias between (Greek), none of them
are merely verbal quibbles, it is implied that this question, although it
has not yet received a solution in theory, has been already answered by
Charmides himself, who has learned to practise the virtue of self-knowledge
which philosophers are vainly trying to define in words. In a similar
spirit we might say to a young man who is disturbed by theological
difficulties, 'Do not trouble yourself about such matters, but only lead a
good life;' and yet in either case it is not to be denied that right ideas
of truth may contribute greatly to the improvement of character.

The reasons why the Charmides, Lysis, Laches have been placed together and
first in the series of Platonic dialogues, are: (i) Their shortness and
simplicity. The Charmides and the Lysis, if not the Laches, are of the
same 'quality' as the Phaedrus and Symposium: and it is probable, though
far from certain, that the slighter effort preceded the greater one. (ii)
Their eristic, or rather Socratic character; they belong to the class
called dialogues of search (Greek), which have no conclusion. (iii) The
absence in them of certain favourite notions of Plato, such as the doctrine