I have little official knowledge on the tactics of the campaign; it is
necessary, however, here to allude to the plan of proceeding known to
every one who took any part in it. The vital consideration to the
advance of any army across the Namib Desert is to secure the
water-holes on the Swakop River. The Swakop is by no means the usual
prepossessing kind of stream that flows efficiently between wide banks.
It flowed actually for a day just after General Botha landed at
Swakopmund--the first and last time, apparently, within the memory of
man. But it has water in it nevertheless; and at fixed and charted
spots are to be found bore-holes and wells for the convenience of
dwellers in the profitless wilderness. The principal wells and holes
are at the places marked on the diagram. General Botha's principal task
was to take an army right across the Namib Desert, and to do that he
had to capture every water-hole and keep it. It is true that at certain
points in the Swakop and other of the large rivers of South-West Africa
you can find water by digging very near the surface--perhaps. But when
you have a parched army at your back you must deal as little as
possible in speculation. At Riet and Jakalswater the enemy had
determined to hold the valuable water-holes at any cost, but especially
at Riet.

When General Botha treks he treks at express speed. With him the
intention is that the essence of strategy shall be surprise. The
Commander-in-Chief left Swakopmund at 2.30 a.m. on the 18th of March.
We outspanned at Goanikontes, thirty-four kilos, at 10.30 that night.
Goanikontes was left at 6.30 a.m., and the Husab Outspan was made at
10.20 that morning. The rest of the day was spent at Husab; at 6.30 in
the evening the Commander-in-Chief, and with him General Brits, left
for Riet, outspanned for a few hours and attacked the German position