how little he knows the man, who will certainly not go away until he has
cross-examined the company about their past lives. Nicias has often
submitted to this process; and Laches is quite willing to learn from
Socrates, because his actions, in the true Dorian mode, correspond to his
words.

Socrates proceeds: We might ask who are our teachers? But a better and
more thorough way of examining the question will be to ask, 'What is
Virtue?'--or rather, to restrict the enquiry to that part of virtue which
is concerned with the use of weapons--'What is Courage?' Laches thinks
that he knows this: (1) 'He is courageous who remains at his post.' But
some nations fight flying, after the manner of Aeneas in Homer; or as the
heavy-armed Spartans also did at the battle of Plataea. (2) Socrates wants
a more general definition, not only of military courage, but of courage of
all sorts, tried both amid pleasures and pains. Laches replies that this
universal courage is endurance. But courage is a good thing, and mere
endurance may be hurtful and injurious. Therefore (3) the element of
intelligence must be added. But then again unintelligent endurance may
often be more courageous than the intelligent, the bad than the good. How
is this contradiction to be solved? Socrates and Laches are not set 'to
the Dorian mode' of words and actions; for their words are all confusion,
although their actions are courageous. Still they must 'endure' in an
argument about endurance. Laches is very willing, and is quite sure that
he knows what courage is, if he could only tell.

Nicias is now appealed to; and in reply he offers a definition which he has
heard from Socrates himself, to the effect that (1) 'Courage is
intelligence.' Laches derides this; and Socrates enquires, 'What sort of
intelligence?' to which Nicias replies, 'Intelligence of things terrible.'
'But every man knows the things to be dreaded in his own art.' 'No they do