SOCRATES: Then courage is not the science which is concerned with the
fearful and hopeful, for they are future only; courage, like the other
sciences, is concerned not only with good and evil of the future, but of
the present and past, and of any time?

NICIAS: That, as I suppose, is true.

SOCRATES: Then the answer which you have given, Nicias, includes only a
third part of courage; but our question extended to the whole nature of
courage: and according to your view, that is, according to your present
view, courage is not only the knowledge of the hopeful and the fearful, but
seems to include nearly every good and evil without reference to time.
What do you say to that alteration in your statement?

NICIAS: I agree, Socrates.

SOCRATES: But then, my dear friend, if a man knew all good and evil, and
how they are, and have been, and will be produced, would he not be perfect,
and wanting in no virtue, whether justice, or temperance, or holiness? He
would possess them all, and he would know which were dangers and which were
not, and guard against them whether they were supernatural or natural; and
he would provide the good, as he would know how to deal both with gods or
men.

NICIAS: I think, Socrates, that there is a great deal of truth in what you
say.

SOCRATES: But then, Nicias, courage, according to this new definition of
yours, instead of being a part of virtue only, will be all virtue?