slipping away from the point, and instead of answering, making a speech at
such length that most of his hearers forget the question at issue (not that
Socrates is likely to forget--I will be bound for that, although he may
pretend in fun that he has a bad memory). And Socrates appears to me to be
more in the right than Protagoras; that is my view, and every man ought to
say what he thinks.

When Alcibiades had done speaking, some one--Critias, I believe--went on to
say: O Prodicus and Hippias, Callias appears to me to be a partisan of
Protagoras: and this led Alcibiades, who loves opposition, to take the
other side. But we should not be partisans either of Socrates or of
Protagoras; let us rather unite in entreating both of them not to break up
the discussion.

Prodicus added: That, Critias, seems to me to be well said, for those who
are present at such discussions ought to be impartial hearers of both the
speakers; remembering, however, that impartiality is not the same as
equality, for both sides should be impartially heard, and yet an equal meed
should not be assigned to both of them; but to the wiser a higher meed
should be given, and a lower to the less wise. And I as well as Critias
would beg you, Protagoras and Socrates, to grant our request, which is,
that you will argue with one another and not wrangle; for friends argue
with friends out of good-will, but only adversaries and enemies wrangle.
And then our meeting will be delightful; for in this way you, who are the
speakers, will be most likely to win esteem, and not praise only, among us
who are your audience; for esteem is a sincere conviction of the hearers'
souls, but praise is often an insincere expression of men uttering
falsehoods contrary to their conviction. And thus we who are the hearers
will be gratified and not pleased; for gratification is of the mind when
receiving wisdom and knowledge, but pleasure is of the body when eating or