any other of them? And you replied that the five names were not the names
of the same thing, but that each of them had a separate object, and that
all these objects were parts of virtue, not in the same way that the parts
of gold are like each other and the whole of which they are parts, but as
the parts of the face are unlike the whole of which they are parts and one
another, and have each of them a distinct function. I should like to know
whether this is still your opinion; or if not, I will ask you to define
your meaning, and I shall not take you to task if you now make a different
statement. For I dare say that you may have said what you did only in
order to make trial of me.

I answer, Socrates, he said, that all these qualities are parts of virtue,
and that four out of the five are to some extent similar, and that the
fifth of them, which is courage, is very different from the other four, as
I prove in this way: You may observe that many men are utterly
unrighteous, unholy, intemperate, ignorant, who are nevertheless remarkable
for their courage.

Stop, I said; I should like to think about that. When you speak of brave
men, do you mean the confident, or another sort of nature?

Yes, he said; I mean the impetuous, ready to go at that which others are
afraid to approach.

In the next place, you would affirm virtue to be a good thing, of which
good thing you assert yourself to be a teacher.

Yes, he said; I should say the best of all things, if I am in my right
mind.