if we are not, upon conviction, to follow their dictates?

No man has any reason to apprehend any ill consequences to truth,
(for which alone he ought to have any concern,) from free inquiry
and debate.--For truth is not a thing to dread examination, but
when fairly proposed to an unbiased understanding, is like light to
the eye; it must distinguish itself from error, as light does
distinguish does distinguish itself from darkness. For, while free
debate is allowed, truth is in no danger, for it will never want a
professor thereof, nor an advocate to offer some plea in its behalf.
And it can never be wholly banished, but when human decisions,
backed by human power, carry all before them.

We ought to examine foundations of opinions, not only, that we
may attain the discovery of truth, but we ought to do so, on this
account, because that it is our duty; and the way to recommend
ourselves to the favour of God. For opinions, how true soever,
when the effect of education or tradition, or interest, or passion,
can never recommend a man to God. For those ways have no merit
in them, and are the worst a man can possibly take to obtain truth;
and therefore, though they may be objects of forgiveness, they can
never be of reward from Him.

Having promised these observations in order to persuade, and
dispose the reader to be candid, I will now declare the motives,
which induced me to submit to the consideration of the intelligent,
the contents of this volume. The Author has spared, he thinks, no
pains to arrive at certain Truth in matters of religion; the; sense of
which is what distinguishes man from the brute. And in this most
important subject that can employ the human understanding, he