what another man’s opinions shall be. It is amazing that one man
can dare to presume he has such a right over another; and that any
man can be so weak and credulous, as to imagine, that another has
such right over him.

As it is every man's natural right and duty to think and judge for
himself in matters of opinion; so he should be allowed freely to
bring forward and defend his opinions, and to endeavour, when be
judges proper, to convince others also of their truth.

For unless all men are allowed freely to profess their opinions, the
means of information, with respect to opinions, must, in a great
measure, be wanting; and just inquiries into their truth be almost
impracticable; and, by consequence, our natural right and duty to
think and judge for ourselves, must be rendered almost nugatory,
or be subverted, for want of materials whereon to employ our
minds. A man by himself, without communication with other
minds, can make no great progress in knowledge; and besides, an
individual is indisposed to use his own strength, when an
undisturbed laziness, ignorance, and prejudice give him full
satisfaction as to the truth of his opinions. But if there be a free
profession, or communication of sentiment, every man will have
an opportunity of acquainting himself with all that can be known
from others; and many for their own satisfaction will make
inquiries, and, in order to ascertain the truth of opinions, will desire
to know all that can be said on any question.

If such liberty of professing and teaching be not allowed, error, if
authorized, will keep its ground; and truth, if dormant, will never
be brought to light; or, if authorized, will be supported on a false