everywhere else, Plato is making war against the philosophers who put words
in the place of things, who tear arguments to tatters, who deny
predication, and thus make knowledge impossible, to whom ideas and objects
of sense have no fixedness, but are in a state of perpetual oscillation and
transition. Two great truths seem to be indirectly taught through these
fallacies: (1) The uncertainty of language, which allows the same words to
be used in different meanings, or with different degrees of meaning: (2)
The necessary limitation or relative nature of all phenomena. Plato is
aware that his own doctrine of ideas, as well as the Eleatic Being and Not-
being, alike admit of being regarded as verbal fallacies. The sophism
advanced in the Meno, 'that you cannot enquire either into what you know or
do not know,' is lightly touched upon at the commencement of the Dialogue;
the thesis of Protagoras, that everything is true to him to whom it seems
to be true, is satirized. In contrast with these fallacies is maintained
the Socratic doctrine that happiness is gained by knowledge. The
grammatical puzzles with which the Dialogue concludes probably contain
allusions to tricks of language which may have been practised by the
disciples of Prodicus or Antisthenes. They would have had more point, if
we were acquainted with the writings against which Plato's humour is
directed. Most of the jests appear to have a serious meaning; but we have
lost the clue to some of them, and cannot determine whether, as in the
Cratylus, Plato has or has not mixed up purely unmeaning fun with his
satire.

The two discourses of Socrates may be contrasted in several respects with
the exhibition of the Sophists: (1) In their perfect relevancy to the
subject of discussion, whereas the Sophistical discourses are wholly
irrelevant: (2) In their enquiring sympathetic tone, which encourages the
youth, instead of 'knocking him down,' after the manner of the two
Sophists: (3) In the absence of any definite conclusion--for while