was long before the new world of ideas which had been sought after with
such passionate yearning was set in order and made ready for use. To us
the fallacies which arise in the pre-Socratic philosophy are trivial and
obsolete because we are no longer liable to fall into the errors which are
expressed by them. The intellectual world has become better assured to us,
and we are less likely to be imposed upon by illusions of words.

The logic of Aristotle is for the most part latent in the dialogues of
Plato. The nature of definition is explained not by rules but by examples
in the Charmides, Lysis, Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Euthyphro, Theaetetus,
Gorgias, Republic; the nature of division is likewise illustrated by
examples in the Sophist and Statesman; a scheme of categories is found in
the Philebus; the true doctrine of contradiction is taught, and the fallacy
of arguing in a circle is exposed in the Republic; the nature of synthesis
and analysis is graphically described in the Phaedrus; the nature of words
is analysed in the Cratylus; the form of the syllogism is indicated in the
genealogical trees of the Sophist and Statesman; a true doctrine of
predication and an analysis of the sentence are given in the Sophist; the
different meanings of one and being are worked out in the Parmenides. Here
we have most of the important elements of logic, not yet systematized or
reduced to an art or science, but scattered up and down as they would
naturally occur in ordinary discourse. They are of little or no use or
significance to us; but because we have grown out of the need of them we
should not therefore despise them. They are still interesting and
instructive for the light which they shed on the history of the human mind.

There are indeed many old fallacies which linger among us, and new ones are
constantly springing up. But they are not of the kind to which ancient
logic can be usefully applied. The weapons of common sense, not the
analytics of Aristotle, are needed for their overthrow. Nor is the use of