hatred.

Meanwhile a council of war was sitting at the French settlement,
Charlefort. Ribault, contrary to the wishes of Laudonnière and the
rest, decided to anticipate the Spaniards by an attack from the sea. A
few sick men were left with Laudonnière to garrison the fort; all the
rest went on board. Just as everything was ready for the attack, a
gale sprang up, and the fleet of Ribault, instead of bearing down on
St. Augustine, was straggling in confusion off an unknown and perilous
coast. Menendez, relieved from immediate fear for his own settlement,
determined on a bold stroke. Like Ribault, he bore down the opposition
of a cautious majority, and with five hundred picked men marched
overland through thirty miles of swamp and jungle against the French
fort. Thus each commander was exposing his own settlement in order to
menace his enemies.

In judging, however, of the relative prudence of the two plans, it
must be remembered that an attack by land is far more under control,
and far less liable to be disarranged by unforeseen chances than one
by sea. At first it seemed as if each expedition was destined to the
same fate. The weather was as unfavorable to the Spanish by land as to
the French by sea. At one time a mutiny was threatened, but Menendez
succeeded in inspiring his men with something of his own enthusiasm,
and they persevered. Led by a French deserter, they approached the
unprotected settlement. So stormy was the night that the sentinels had
left the walls. The fort was stormed; Laudonnière and a few others
escaped to the shore and were picked up by one of Ribault's vessels
returning from its unsuccessful expedition. The rest, to the number of
one hundred and forty, were slain in the attack or taken prisoners.
The women and children were spared, the men were hung on trees with an