duty just as they were before. The most that law can do is to equalize
the _conditions of sale_. If it should be said that I am playing upon
words, I retort the accusation upon my adversaries. It is for them to
prove that _production_ and _sale_ are synonymous terms, which if they
cannot do, I have a right to accuse them, if not of playing upon
words, at least of confounding them.

Let me be permitted to exemplify my idea.

Suppose that several New York speculators should determine to devote
themselves to the production of oranges. They know that the oranges of
Portugal can be sold in New York at one cent each, whilst on account
of the boxes, hot-houses, &c., which are necessary to ward against
the severity of our climate, it is impossible to raise them at less
than a dollar apiece. They accordingly demand a duty of ninety-nine
cents upon Portugal oranges. With the help of this duty, say they, the
_conditions of production_ will be equalized. Congress, yielding as
usual to this argument, imposes a duty of ninety-nine cents on each
foreign orange.

Now I say that the _relative conditions of production_ are in no wise
changed. The law can take nothing from the heat of the sun in Lisbon,
nor from the severity of the frosts in New York. Oranges continuing to
mature themselves _naturally_ on the banks of the Tagus, and
artificially upon those of the Hudson, must continue to require for
their production much more labor on the latter than the former. The
law can only equalize the _conditions of sale_. It is evident that
while the Portuguese sell their oranges here at a dollar apiece, the
ninety-nine cents which go to pay the tax are taken from the American
consumer. Now look at the whimsicality of the result. Upon each