(j) And other facts or matters arising out of the crash that, in
the interests of public safety, should be known to the authorities
charged with the administration of civil aviation in order that
appropriate measures may be taken for the safety of persons engaged
in aviation or carried as passengers in aircraft.

In its essentials the argument is that in order to answer the questions
posed by paragraph (g) the Commissioner found it necessary or was
entitled to explain the process by which he reached his final
conclusions; that in doing so he was entitled to comment upon the
quality of the evidence that was given in the course of the Royal
Commission Inquiry; that the assessment of witnesses was a necessary
part of the findings he reached as to the cause of the accident; that
the assessment was not a part of the substantive findings of the
Commission; and "whether having reached his conclusion he expresses
himself vehemently or refrains from pungent comment is entirely a matter
for him". Similar submissions were made in relation to the second cause
of action and natural justice.

In certain circumstances it is obvious enough that reasons for rejecting
evidence would not merely be relevant but often a necessary part of a
decision. But considerations of that kind are far removed from the
conclusions expressed in paragraph 377. There it is said that the ten
senior members of this airline had been involved in organized deception.
"Palpably false sections of evidence ... a pre-determined plan of
deception ... an attempt to conceal a series of disastrous
administrative blunders ... an orchestrated litany of lies". These are
unlikely phrases to associate with a mere assessment of the credibility
of witnesses.