sweep loose snow off the surface and fill the air with these fine
white particles. A landing on the special whiteout landing field
can be accomplished only by an aircraft equipped with skis or, in
the case of an aircraft without skis, then it must make a belly-up
landing on this snow-covered emergency airfield. Flying in a
'whiteout' of that description is no different from flying in thick
cloud. The pilot cannot know where he is and must land in
accordance with strict radio and radar directions. So far as I
understand the evidence, I do not believe that either the airline
or Civil Aviation Division ever understood the term 'whiteout' to
mean anything else than a snowstorm. I do not believe that they
were ever aware, until they read the chief inspector's report of
the type of 'whiteout' which occurs in clear air, in calm
conditions, and which creates this visual illusion which I have
previously described and which is, without doubt, the most
dangerous of all polar weather phenomena.

While largely agreed about the whiteout conditions, the Commissioner and
the Chief Inspector took quite different views as to whether the crew
had been uncertain of their position and visibility. This disagreement
is associated with a major difference as to the interpretation of the
tape recovered from the cockpit voice recorder covering the conversation
on the flight deck during the 30 minutes before the crash.

Both the Commissioner and the Chief Inspector found difficulty in
arriving at an opinion about what was said and by whom. Whereas the
Chief Inspector thought that the two flight engineers had voiced
mounting alarm at proceeding at a low level towards a cloud-covered
area, the Commissioner thought that Captain Collins and First Officer
Cassin had never expressed the slightest doubt as to where the aircraft