(f) I have reviewed the evidence in support of the allegation that
the Navigation Section believed, by reason of a mistaken verbal
communication, that the altered McMurdo waypoint only involved a
change of 2.1 nautical miles. I am obliged to say that I do not
accept that explanation. There were certainly grave deficiencies in
communication within the Navigation Section, but the high
professional skills of the Navigation Section's staff entirely
preclude the possibility of such an error. In my opinion this
explanation that the change in the waypoint was thought to be
minimal in terms of distance is a concocted story designed to
explain away the fundamental mistake, made by someone, in failing
to ensure that Captain Collins was notified that his aircraft was
now programmed to fly on a collision course with Mt. Erebus.

These paragraphs are attacked on the grounds, in short, that the members
of the navigation section said to be adversely affected by
them--according to the applicants, Mr R. Brown as regards (e) and Messrs
Amies, Brown, Hewitt and Lawton as regards (f)--were not given a fair
opportunity of answering the findings or allegations.

To understand this complaint one needs a clear picture of what it was
that the Commission found or alleged against the navigation section.
When studying the report as a whole we have encountered difficulties in
this regard, difficulties not altogether removed when we explored them
during the argument with Mr Baragwanath. But our understanding is that
in essence the Commissioner suggests that the original change of the
southernmost point to one in the Sound, 25 miles west of McMurdo
Station, was probably deliberate on the part of the navigation section
(although he refrained from a definite finding) and that in November
1979 they deliberately made a major change back to the vicinity of