(as was recognised in _Cock's_ case at p. 425) and also that to some
degree any Commission of Inquiry has the right to express its opinion of
the witnesses, much as a Court or statutory tribunal has that right.

But we think that it is a matter of degree. For present purposes it is
not necessary to decide whether the law of New Zealand is still, as held
in _Cock's_ case, that a Commission of Inquiry cannot lawfully be
constituted to inquire into allegations of crime. That issue may be
raised more directly by the litigation regarding the Thomas Commission.
The issue now to be decided is whether the Commissioner had powers,
implied as being reasonably incidental to his legitimate functions of
inquiry into the causes and circumstances of the crash, to make
assertions amounting to charges of conspiracy to perjure at the inquiry
itself.

In considering that issue the importance of not unreasonably shackling a
Commission of Inquiry has to be weighed. It is also material, however,
that such a charge is calculated to attract the widest publicity, both
national and international. It is scarcely distinguishable in the public
mind from condemnation by a Court of law. Yet it is completely without
the safeguards of rights to trial by jury and appeal. In other words, by
mere implication any Commission of Inquiry, whatever its membership,
would have authority publicly to condemn a group of citizens of a major
crime without the safeguards that invariably go with express powers of
condemnation.

We are not prepared to hold that the Commissioner's implied powers went
so far. We hold that he exceeded his jurisdiction in paragraph 377.

If, contrary to the view just expressed, the Commissioner did have