the courts attach to the observance of the rules of natural
justice. 'When something is obvious,' they may say, 'why force
everybody to go through the tiresome waste of time involved in
framing charges and giving an opportunity to be heard? The result
is obvious from the start.' Those who take this view do not, I
think, do themselves justice. As everybody who has anything to do
with the law well knows, the path of the law is strewn with
examples of open and shut cases which, somehow, were not; of
unanswerable charges which, in the event, were completely answered;
of inexplicable conduct which was fully explained; of fixed and
unalterable determinations that, by discussion, suffered a change.
Nor are those with any knowledge of human nature who pause to think
for a moment likely to underestimate the feelings of resentment of
those who find that a decision against them has been made without
their being afforded any opportunity to influence the course of
events."

In this particular case something more should be said. The applicants
contend that this is not simply a case where the conspiracy suggestion
could not have been rebutted. They plead in their statement of claim
that the Commissioner's findings to that effect are not based on
evidence of probative value. Elsewhere in the present judgment we deal
with aspects of these arguments. Here, dealing with principles, we add
that fairness is not necessarily confined to procedural matters. It can
have wider range. Remedies in this field are discretionary and the law
not inflexible. If a party seeks to show not only that he did not have
an adequate hearing but also that the evidence on which he was condemned
was insubstantial, the Court is not compelled to shut its eyes to the
state of the evidence in deciding whether, looking at the whole case in
perspective, he has been treated fairly.