'whiteout' to mean anything else than a snowstorm. I do not believe
that they were ever aware, until they read the chief inspector's
report, of the type of 'whiteout' which occurs in clear air, in
calm conditions, and which creates this visual illusion which I
have previously described and which is, without doubt, the most
dangerous of all polar weather phenomena."

It would seem that if those at airline headquarters were unaware of the
deceptive dangers of the whiteout phenomenon they could not have
deliberately ignored it as a factor that should be taken into account in
favour of the aircrew.


Instructions of the Chief Executive

In paragraph 41 and following paragraphs there is reference to "what
happened at the airline headquarters at Auckland when the occurrence of
the disaster became first suspected and then known". It is explained
that the navigation section became aware of the fact that when the
McMurdo waypoint co-ordinates were corrected in November 1979 the
movement was not one of 2.1 miles within the vicinity of Williams Field
but a distance of 27 miles from longitude 164° 48' E; and that "by 30
November the occurrence of this mistake over the co-ordinates was known
not only to the Flight Operations Division but also to the management of
the airline. In particular it had been reported to the Chief Executive
of Air New Zealand, Mr. M.R. Davis". At that point there follows the
serious allegation in paragraph 45 already cited--

"The reaction of the chief executive was immediate. He determined
that no word of this incredible blunder was to become publicly