to be its own judge of what was constitutional, and act accordingly.
First, the case of New-York; secondly, the course taken by Massachusetts
in relation to the Embargo law of 1807, which was believed to be
unconstitutional generally in New-England. In the case of New-York,
there was, as has been said, the surrender of any right to secede from
the Union at her pleasure; while in the Embargo law of 1807, which was
brought up to the Supreme Court for decision, there was the acquiescence
of New-England upon the simple point, who should be the final arbiter in
the dispute. Massachusetts and all New-England assented to a decision of
the Judiciary, not upon the ground that it was right, but that the
Supreme Court had alone the authority to say what was right.

In this case there was a perfect refutation of the whole theory of
secession; that theory falls back upon the idea that the State
government is to be its own judge of what constitutes a violation of the
Constitution, and act accordingly; but the Embargo law of 1807, when
carried up to the Supreme bench, and the way New-England assented to a
decision that was not believed to be in accordance with the
Constitution, is a signal rebuke of the assumption of State sovereignty
when arrayed against the General Government. The all-important question
was not, Was the decision of the Judiciary right, but simply, Who had
the authority to say what was right? Who should submit to that
authority? No person can fail to see in these two cases, under
circumstances so widely different, and with an end proposed in each
directly the reverse of the other, that the point so important to
establish was clearly made out, that the National Government reserves to
itself alone the right to decide as to what should be the course taken
in questions of dispute that arise between the States and the Federal
authority.