ages and countries with one another. It may be said to have thrown a light
upon all other sciences and upon the nature of the human mind itself. The
true conception of it dispels many errors, not only of metaphysics and
theology, but also of natural knowledge. Yet it is far from certain that
this newly-found science will continue to progress in the same surprising
manner as heretofore; or that even if our materials are largely increased,
we shall arrive at much more definite conclusions than at present. Like
some other branches of knowledge, it may be approaching a point at which it
can no longer be profitably studied. But at any rate it has brought back
the philosophy of language from theory to fact; it has passed out of the
region of guesses and hypotheses, and has attained the dignity of an
Inductive Science. And it is not without practical and political
importance. It gives a new interest to distant and subject countries; it
brings back the dawning light from one end of the earth to the other.
Nations, like individuals, are better understood by us when we know
something of their early life; and when they are better understood by us,
we feel more kindly towards them. Lastly, we may remember that all
knowledge is valuable for its own sake; and we may also hope that a deeper
insight into the nature of human speech will give us a greater command of
it and enable us to make a nobler use of it. (Compare again W. Humboldt,
'Ueber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues;' M. Muller,
'Lectures on the Science of Language;' Steinthal, 'Einleitung in die
Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft:' and for the latter part of the Essay,
Delbruck, 'Study of Language;' Paul's 'Principles of the History of
Language:' to the latter work the author of this Essay is largely
indebted.)


CRATYLUS