fighting in Asia. Now, under Edh Dhahir Bebars of the Baharide Mameluke
Dynasty, we see them helping to subject Syria and Armenia; now, under
El-Mansur Kalaun, Damascus is captured; and now En Nasir Muhammed is
found reigning from Tunis to Baghdad. In the Circassian Mameluke Dynasty
we see El Muayyad crushing a revolt in Syria, and El Ashraf Bursbey
capturing King John of Cyprus and keeping his hand on Syria. And so the
tale continues, until, as a final picture, we see Ibrahim Pasha leading
the Egyptians into Asia and crushing the Turks at Iconium.

Such is the long list of the wars waged by Egypt in Syria. Are we to
suppose that these continuous incursions into Asia have suddenly come to
an end? Are we to imagine that because there has been a respite for a
hundred years the precedent of six thousand years has now to be
disregarded? By the recent reconquest of the Sudan it has been shown
that the old political necessities still exist for Egypt in the south,
impelling her to be mistress of the upper reaches of the Nile. Is there
now no longer any chance of her expanding in other directions should her
hands become free?

The reader may answer with the argument that in early days England made
invasion after invasion into France, yet ceased after a while to do so.
But this is no parallel. England was impelled to war with France because
the English monarchs believed themselves to be, by inheritance, kings of
a large part of France; and when they ceased to believe this they ceased
to make war. The Pharaohs of Egypt never considered themselves to be
kings of Syria, and never used any title suggesting an inherited
sovereignty. They merely held Syria as a buffer state, and claimed no
more than an overlordship there. Now Syria is still a buffer state, and
the root of the trouble, therefore, still exists. Though I must disclaim
all knowledge of modern politics, I am quite sure that it is no