of strategy_; starting from such a system for a basis, she subdued every
country on the continent that was not thus fortified; and this reason
alone will explain how her generals sometimes succeeded in destroying an
army, and even an entire state, merely by a strategic success."

This may be illustrated by reference to particular campaigns. In 1792,
when the Duke of Brunswick invaded France, she had no armies competent
to her defence. Their numbers upon paper were somewhat formidable, it is
true, but the license of the Revolution had so loosened the bonds of
discipline as to effect an almost complete disorganization. "It seemed,
at this period," says the historian, "as if the operations of the French
generals were dependent upon the absence of their enemies: the moment
they appeared, the operations were precipitately abandoned." But France
had on her eastern frontier a triple line of good fortresses, although
her miserable soldiery were incapable of properly defending them. The
several works of the first and second lines fell, one after another,
before the slow operations of a Prussian siege, and the Duke of
Brunswick was already advancing upon the third, when Dumourier, with
only twenty-five thousand men, threw himself into this line, and by a
well-conducted war of positions, placing his raw and unsteady forces
behind unassailable intrenchments, succeeded in repelling a disciplined
army nearly four times as numerous as his own. Had no other obstacle
than the French troops been interposed between Paris and the Prussians,
all agree that France must have fallen.

In the campaign, of 1793, the French army in Flanders were beaten in
almost every engagement, and their forces reduced to less than one half
the number of the allies. The French general turned traitor to his
country, and the National Guards deserted their colors and returned to
France. The only hope of the Republicans, at this crisis, was Vauban's