spaces, must stop short of the real truth." My experiments, however,
as I have already indicated, go to prove quite the contrary. In short,
I do not think we have any means of distinguishing our tactual
judgments of time from our similar judgments of space. When the
subject is asked to measure off equal spaces, he certainly uses time
as means, because when he is asked to measure off equal times he
registers precisely the same illusion that he makes in his judgments
of spatial distances. The fact that objectively equal times were used
by Dresslar in his experiments is no reason for supposing that the
subject also regarded these times as equal. What I have here asserted
of active touch is true also of the resting skin. When a stylus is
drawn over the skin, the subject's answer to the question, How long is
the distance? is subject to precisely the same illusion as his answer
to the question, How long is the time?

I can by a simple illustration show more plainly what I mean by the
statement that the blending of the inner and outer sensations is
necessary for the perception of space. I shall use the sense of sight
for the illustration, although precisely the same reasoning would
apply to the sense of touch. Suppose that I sat in an entirely passive
position and gazed at a spot on an otherwise blank piece of paper
before me. I am perfectly passive so far as motion on my part is
concerned. I may be engaged in any manner of speculation or be in the
midst of the so-called active attention to the spot; but I must be and
for the present remain motionless. Now, while I am in this condition
of passivity, suppose the spot be made to move slowly to one side by
some force external to myself. I am immovable all the while, and yet
am conscious of this movement of the spot from the first position,
which I call _A_, to the new position, _A'_, where it stops. The
sensation which I now have is qualitatively different from the