sensation of one is.

There remains but one point to be elaborated. If number is not a
quality of objects, but is merely a matter of attitude of the subject,
we should not expect to find a very clear-cut line of demarcation
between the different numbers except with regard to those things which
we constantly consider in terms of number. Some of our associations
are so firmly established and so uniform that we are likely to regard
them as necessary. It is not so with our associations of number and
touch sensations. We have there only a vague, general notion of what
the sensation of one or two is, because usually it does not make much
difference to us, yet some sensations are so well established in our
minds that we call them one, two or four as the case may be without
hesitation. Other sensations are not so, and it is difficult to tell
to which class they belong. Just so it is easy to tell a pure yellow
color from a pure orange, yet they shade into each other, so that it
is impossible to tell where one leaves off and the other begins. If we
could speak of a one-two sensation as we speak of a yellow-orange
color we might be better able to describe our sensations. It would,
indeed, be convenient if we could call a sensation which seems like
one with a suggestion of two about it a two-one sensation, and one
that seems nearly like two but yet suggests one a one-two sensation.
Since we cannot do this, we must do the best we can and describe a
sensation in terms of the number it most strongly suggests. Subjects
very often, as has been mentioned before, describe a sensation as
'more than one but less than two,' but when pressed for an answer will
say whichever number it most resembles. A person would do the same
thing if he were shown spectral colors from orange to yellow and told
to name each one either orange or yellow. At one end he would be sure
to say orange and at the other yellow, but in the middle of the series