In July, 1914, the Italian Government was not taken by surprise. They
had observed the increase year by year of the German army and of the
German fleet. At the end of the Balkan wars they had been asked whether
they would agree to an Austrian attack upon Serbia. They had
consequently long been deliberating as to what their course should be in
case of war, and they had made up their minds that under no
circumstances would they aid Germany against England.

Quite independently of her long-standing friendship with England it
would be suicide to Italy in her geographical position to enter a war
which should permit her coast to be attacked by the English and French
navies, and her participation in the Triple Alliance always carried the
proviso that it did not bind her to fight England. This was well known
in the German foreign office, and, indeed, in France where the writers
upon war were reckoning confidently on the withdrawing of Italy from the
Triple Alliance, and planning to use the entire forces of France against
Germany.

A better understanding of the Italian position will result from a
consideration of the origin of the Triple Alliance.

After the war of 1870, Bismarck, perceiving the quick recovery of
France, considered the advisability of attacking her again, and, to use
his own words, "bleeding her white." He found, however, that if this
were attempted France would be joined by Russia and England and he gave
up this plan. In order, however, to render France powerless he planned
an alliance which should be able to control Europe. A league between
Germany, Austria and Russia was his desire, and for some time every
opportunity was taken to develop friendship with the Czar. Russia,