could cut the railroad running east from the Polish capital. He had
hoped that the attacks just described further east would distract the
Russian attention so that he would find the Narev ill guarded. The
advance began on February 22d, and after numerous battles captured
Przasnysz, and found itself with only one division to oppose its
progress to the railroad. On the 23d this force was attacked by the
German right, but resisted with the utmost courage. It held out for more
than thirty-six hours, until, on the evening of the 24th, Russian
reinforcements began to come up, and drove the invaders north through
Przasnysz in retreat.

It was an extraordinary fight. The Russians were unable to supply all
their troops with munitions and arms. At Przasnysz men fought without
rifles, armed only with a bayonet. All they could do was to charge with
cold steel, and they did it so desperately that, though they were
outnumbered, they drove the Germans before them. By all the laws of war
the Russians should have been defeated with ease. As it was, the German
attempt to capture Warsaw by a flank movement was defeated. While the
struggle was going on in the north, the Austrian armies in Galicia were
also moving, Russia was still holding the three great passes in the
Carpathian Mountains, but had not been able to begin an offensive in
Hungary.

The Austrians had been largely reinforced by German troops, and were
moving forward to the relief of Przemysl, and also to drive Brussilov
from the Galician mountains. Brussilov's movements had been partly
military and partly political. From the passes, in those mountains
Hungary could be attacked, and unless he could be driven away there was
no security for the Hungarian cornfields, to which Germany was looking
for food supplies. Moreover, from the beginning of the Russian movement