description. But to be selected and marked out by a particular brand of
unworthiness among our fellow-citizens is a lot of all others the
hardest to be borne, and consequently is of all others that act winch
ought only to be trusted to the legislature, as not only _legislative_
in its nature, but of all parts of legislature the most odious. The
question is over, if this is shown not to be a legislative act.

But what is very usual and natural is, to corrupt judicature into
legislature. On this point it is proper to inquire whether a court of
judicature which decides without appeal has it as a necessary incident
of such judicature, that whatever it decides is _de jure_ law. Nobody
will, I hope, assert this; because the direct consequence would be the
entire extinction of the difference between true and false judgments.
For if the judgment makes the law, and not the law directs the judgment,
it is impossible there should be such a thing as an illegal judgment
given.

But instead of standing upon this ground, they introduce another
question wholly foreign to it: Whether it ought not to be submitted to
as if it were law? And then the question is,--By the Constitution of
this country, what degree of submission is due to the authoritative acts
of a limited power? This question of submission, determine it how you
please, has nothing to do in this discussion and in this House. Here it
is not, how long the people are bound to tolerate the illegality of our
judgments, but whether we have a right to substitute our occasional
opinion in the place of law, so as to deprive the citizen of his
franchise....