to say, not that everything we see is in Brahman, but rather that
everything we see is out of Brahman, viz. as a false appearance spread
over it and hiding it from us.

Stress has been laid[27] upon certain passages of the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka
which seem to hint at the unreality of this world by qualifying terms,
indicative of duality or plurality of existence, by means of an added
'iva,' i.e. 'as it were' (yatrânyad iva syât; yatra dvaitam iva bhavati;
âtmâ dhyâyatîva lelâyatîva). Those passages no doubt readily lend
themselves to Mâyâ interpretations, and it is by no means impossible
that in their author's mind there was something like an undeveloped Mâyâ
doctrine. I must, however, remark that they, on the other hand, also
admit of easy interpretations not in any way presupposing the theory of
the unreality of the world. If Yâj/ñ/avalkya refers to the latter as
that 'where there is something else as it were, where there is duality
as it were,' he may simply mean to indicate that the ordinary opinion,
according to which the individual forms of existence of the world are
opposed to each other as altogether separate, is a mistaken one, all
things being one in so far as they spring from--and are parts
of--Brahman. This would in no way involve duality or plurality being
unreal in /S/a@nkara's sense, not any more than, for instance, the modes
of Spinoza are unreal because, according to that philosopher, there is
only one universal substance. And with regard to the clause 'the Self
thinks as it were' it has to be noted that according to the commentators
the 'as it were' is meant to indicate that truly not the Self is
thinking, but the upadhis, i.e. especially the manas with which the Self
is connected. But whether these upadhis are the mere offspring of Mâyâ,
as /S/a@nkara thinks, or real forms of existence, as Râmânuja teaches,
is an altogether different question.