man, or something else,' is not knowledge of truth; the two ideas, 'it
is a man or something else,' being false, and only the third idea, 'it
is a post,' which depends on the thing itself, falling under the head of
true knowledge. Thus true knowledge of all existing things depends on
the things themselves, and hence the knowledge of Brahman also depends
altogether on the thing, i.e. Brahman itself.--But, it might be said, as
Brahman is an existing substance, it will be the object of the other
means of right knowledge also, and from this it follows that a
discussion of the Vedânta-texts is purposeless.--This we deny; for as
Brahman is not an object of the senses, it has no connection with those
other means of knowledge. For the senses have, according to their
nature, only external things for their objects, not Brahman. If Brahman
were an object of the senses, we might perceive that the world is
connected with Brahman as its effect; but as the effect only (i.e. the
world) is perceived, it is impossible to decide (through perception)
whether it is connected with Brahman or something else. Therefore the
Sûtra under discussion is not meant to propound inference (as the means
of knowing Brahman), but rather to set forth a Vedânta-text.--Which,
then, is the Vedânta-text which the Sûtra points at as having to be
considered with reference to the characteristics of Brahman?--It is the
passage Taitt. Up. III, 1, 'Bh/ri/gu Vâru/n/i went to his father
Varu/n/a, saying, Sir, teach me Brahman,' &c., up to 'That from whence
these beings are born, that by which, when born, they live, that into
which they enter at their death, try to know that. That is Brahman.' The
sentence finally determining the sense of this passage is found III, 6:
'From bliss these beings are born; by bliss, when born, they live; into
bliss they enter at their death.' Other passages also are to be adduced
which declare the cause to be the almighty Being, whose essential nature
is eternal purity, intelligence, and freedom.