object of knowledge only. Of such a Brahman or its knowledge it is
impossible to establish, by reasoning, any connection with actions.

Nor, again, can we connect Brahman with acts by representing it as the
object of the action of knowing. For that it is not such is expressly
declared in two passages, viz. 'It is different from the known and again
above (i.e. different from) the unknown' (Ken. Up. I, 3); and 'How
should he know him by whom he knows all this?' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 13.)
In the same way Brahman is expressly declared not to be the object of
the act of devout meditation, viz. in the second half of the verse, Ken.
Up. I, 5, whose first half declares it not to be an object (of speech,
mind, and so on), 'That which is not proclaimed by speech, by which
speech is proclaimed, that only know to be Brahman, not that on which
people devoutly meditate as this.' If it should be objected that if
Brahman is not an object (of speech, mind, &c.) the sâstra can
impossibly be its source, we refute this objection by the remark that
the aim of the sâstra is to discard all distinctions fictitiously
created by Nescience. The sâstra's purport is not to represent Brahman
definitely as this or that object, its purpose is rather to show that
Brahman as the eternal subject (pratyagâtman, the inward Self) is never
an object, and thereby to remove the distinction of objects known,
knowers, acts of knowledge, &c., which is fictitiously created by
Nescience. Accordingly the sâstra says, 'By whom it is not thought by
him it is thought, by whom it is thought he does not know it; unknown by
those who know it, it is known by those who do not know it' (Ken. Up.
II, 3); and 'Thou couldst not see the seer of sight, thou couldst not
hear the hearer of hearing, nor perceive the perceiver of perception,
nor know the knower of knowledge' (B/ri/. Up. III, 4, 2). As thereby
(i.e. by the knowledge derived from the sâstra) the imagination of the
transitoriness of Release which is due to Nescience is discarded, and