contradictions.

With reference again to the assertion that Brahman is not fully
determined in its own nature, but stands in a complementary relation to
injunctions, because the hearing about Brahman is to be followed by
consideration and reflection, we remark that consideration and
reflection are themselves merely subservient to the comprehension of
Brahman. If Brahman, after having been comprehended, stood in a
subordinate relation to some injunctions, it might be said to be merely
supplementary. But this is not the case, since consideration and
reflection no less than hearing are subservient to comprehension. It
follows that the /S/âstra cannot be the means of knowing Brahman only in
so far as it is connected with injunctions, and the doctrine that on
account of the uniform meaning of the Vedânta-texts, an independent
Brahman is to be admitted, is thereby fully established. Hence there is
room for beginning the new /S/âstra indicated in the first Sûtra, 'Then
therefore the enquiry into Brahman.' If, on the other hand, the
Vedânta-texts were connected with injunctions, a new /S/âstra would
either not be begun at all, since the /S/âstra concerned with
injunctions has already been introduced by means of the first Sûtra of
the Pûrva Mîmâ/m/sâ, 'Then therefore the enquiry into duty;' or if it
were begun it would be introduced as follows: 'Then therefore the
enquiry into the remaining duties;' just as a new portion of the Pûrva
Mîmâ/m/sâ Sûtras is introduced with the words, 'Then therefore the
enquiry into what subserves the purpose of the sacrifice, and what
subserves the purpose of man' (Pû. Mî. Sû. IV, 1, 1). But as the
comprehension of the unity of Brahman and the Self has not been
propounded (in the previous /S/âstra), it is quite appropriate that a
new /S/âstra, whose subject is Brahman, should be entered upon. Hence
all injunctions and all other means of knowledge end with the cognition