nature has become manifest, i.e. in which it is Brahman; so that the
subject of the passage is in reality not the so-called individual soul
but Brahman. And in the former of the two passages the soul is mentioned
not on its own account, but merely for the purpose of intimating that
the highest Self is the cause through which the individual soul
manifests itself in its true nature.--What Râmânuja understands by the
âvirbhâva of the soul will appear from the remarks on IV, 4.

The two next Sûtras (22, 23) constitute, according to /S/a@nkara, a new
adhikara/n/a (VII), proving that he 'after whom everything shines, by
whose light all this is lighted' (Ka/th/a Up. II, 5, 15) is not some
material luminous body, but Brahman itself.--According to Râmânuja the
two Sûtras do not start a new topic, but merely furnish some further
arguments strengthening the conclusion arrived at in the preceding
Sûtras.[9]

Adhik. VIII (24, 25) decides that the person of the size of a thumb
mentioned in Ka/th/a Up. II, 4, 12 is not the individual soul but
Brahman.

The two next adhikara/n/as are of the nature of a digression. The
passage about the a@ngush/th/amâtra was explained on the ground that the
human heart is of the size of a span; the question may then be asked
whether also such individuals as belong to other classes than mankind,
more particularly the Gods, are capable of the knowledge of Brahman: a
question finally answered in the affirmative.--This discussion leads in
its turn to several other digressions, among which the most important
one refers to the problem in what relation the different species of
beings stand to the words denoting them (Sûtra 28). In connexion
herewith /S/a@nkara treats of the nature of words (/s/abda), opposing