B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 17 are not the twenty-five principles of the
Sâ@nkhyas.--Adhik. IV (14, 15) proves that Scripture does not contradict
itself on the all-important point of Brahman, i.e. a being whose essence
is intelligence, being the cause of the world.

Adhik. V (16-18) is, according to /S/a@nkara, meant to prove that 'he
who is the maker of those persons, of whom this is the work,' mentioned
in Kau. Up. IV, 19, is not either the vital air or the individual soul,
but Brahman.--The subject of the adhikara/n/a is essentially the same in
Râmânuja's view; greater stress is, however, laid on the adhikara/n/a
being polemical against the Sâ@nkhyas, who wish to turn the passage into
an argument for the pradhâna doctrine.

The same partial difference of view is observable with regard to the
next adhikara/n/a (VI; Sûtras 19-22) which decides that the 'Self to be
seen, to be heard,' &c. (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5) is the highest Self, not
the individual soul. This latter passage also is, according to Râmânuja,
made the subject of discussion in order to rebut the Sâ@nkhya who is
anxious to prove that what is there inculcated as the object of
knowledge is not a universal Self but merely the Sâ@nkhya purusha.

Adhik. VII (23-27) teaches that Brahman is not only the efficient or
operative cause (nimitta) of the world, but its material cause as well.
The world springs from Brahman by way of modification (pari/n/âma; Sûtra
26).--Râmânuja views this adhikara/n/a as specially directed against the
Se/s/vara-sâ@nkhyas who indeed admit the existence of a highest Lord,
but postulate in addition an independent pradhâna on which the Lord acts
as an operative cause merely.

Adhik. VIII (28) remarks that the refutation of the Sâ@nkhya views is