an embodied being, is affected by the experiences of pleasure and pain
which his servants have to undergo.--The construction which Râmânuja
puts on the Sûtra is not repugnant either to the words of the Sûtra or
to the context in which the latter stands, and that it rests on earlier
authority appears from a quotation made by Râmànuja from the
Drami/d/abhâshyakâra[13].

Adhik. VI (14-20) treats of the non-difference of the effect from the
cause; a Vedânta doctrine which is defended by its adherents against the
Vai/s/eshikas according to whom the effect is something different from
the cause.--The divergent views of /S/a@nkara and Râmânuja on this
important point have been sufficiently illustrated in the general sketch
of the two systems.

Adhik. VII (21-23) refutes the objection that, from the Vedic passages
insisting on the identity of the Lord and the individual soul, it
follows that the Lord must be like the individual soul the cause of
evil, and that hence the entire doctrine of an all-powerful and all-wise
Lord being the cause of the world has to be rejected. For, the Sûtrakîra
remarks, the creative principle of the world is additional to, i.e.
other than, the individual soul, the difference of the two being
distinctly declared by Scripture.--The way in which the three Sûtras
constituting this adhikara/n/a are treated by /S/a@nkara on the one hand
and Râmânuja on the other is characteristic. Râmânuja throughout simply
follows the words of the Sûtras, of which Sûtra 21 formulates the
objection based on such texts as 'Thou art that,' while Sûtra 22 replies
that Brahman is different from the soul, since that is expressly
declared by Scripture. /S/a@nkara, on the other hand, sees himself
obliged to add that the difference of the two, plainly maintained in
Sûtra 22, is not real, but due to the soul's fictitious limiting