Adhik. XIII (37) sums up the preceding argumentation by declaring that
all the qualities of Brahman--omniscience and so on--are such as to
capacitate it for the creation of the world.


PÂDA II.


The task of the second pâda is to refute, by arguments independent of
Vedic passages, the more important philosophical theories concerning the
origin of the world which are opposed to the Vedânta view.--The first
adhikara/n/a (1-10) is directed against the Sâ@nkhyas, whose doctrine
had already been touched upon incidentally in several previous places,
and aims at proving that a non-intelligent first cause, such as the
pradhâna of the Sâ@nkhyas, is unable to create and dispose.--The second
adhikara/n/a (11-17) refutes the Vai/s/eshika tenet that the world
originates from atoms set in motion by the ad/ri/sh/t/a.--The third and
fourth adhikara/n/as are directed against various schools of Bauddha
philosophers. Adhik. III (18-27) impugns the view of the so-called
sarvâstitvavâdins, or bâhyârthavâdins, who maintain the reality of an
external as well as an internal world; Adhik. IV (28-32) is directed
against the vij/ñ/ânavâdins, according to whom ideas are the only
reality.--The last Sûtra of this adhikara/n/a is treated by Râmânuja as
a separate adhikara/n/a refuting the view of the Mâdhyamikas, who teach
that everything is void, i.e. that nothing whatever is real.--Adhik. V
(33-36) is directed against the doctrine of the Jainas; Adhik. VI
(37-41) against those philosophical schools which teach that a highest
Lord is not the material but only the operative cause of the world.

The last adhikara/n/a of the pâda (42-45) refers, according to the