are cognizing agents; only, whenever a new creation takes place, they
associate themselves with bodies, and their intelligence therewith
undergoes a certain expansion or development (vikâsa); contrasting with
the unevolved or contracted state (sanko/k/a) which characterised it
during the preceding pralaya. But this change is not a change of
essential nature (svarûpânyathâbhâva) and hence we have to distinguish
the souls as permanent entities from the material elements which at the
time of each creation and reabsorption change their essential
characteristics.

Adhik. XII (18) defines the nature of the individual soul. The Sûtra
declares that the soul is 'j/ñ/a.' This means, according to /S/a@nkara,
that intelligence or knowledge does not, as the Vai/s/eshikas teach,
constitute a mere attribute of the soul which in itself is essentially
non-intelligent, but is the very essence of the soul. The soul is not a
knower, but knowledge; not intelligent, but intelligence.--Râmânuja, on
the other hand, explains 'j/ñ/a' by 'j/ñ/at/ri/,' i.e. knower, knowing
agent, and considers the Sûtra to be directed not only against the
Vai/s/eshikas, but also against those philosophers who--like the
Sâ@nkhyas and the Vedântins of /S/a@nkara's school--maintain that the
soul is not a knowing agent, but pure /k/aitanya.--The wording of the
Sûtra certainly seems to favour Râmânuja's interpretation; we can hardly
imagine that an author definitely holding the views of /S/a@nkara
should, when propounding the important dogma of the soul's nature, use
the term j/ñ/a of which the most obvious interpretation j/ñ/ât/ri/, not
j/ñ/ânam.

Adhik. XIII (19-32) treats the question whether the individual soul is
a/n/u, i.e. of very minute size, or omnipresent, all-pervading
(sarvagata, vyâpin). Here, again, we meet with diametrically opposite