it, and every reader may study the whole course mapped out for the
development of the German Navy with the greatest ease.

Thirty to Forty Battleships in 1920.

The law is being adhered to, and provides for about thirty to forty
ships of the line in 1920. The number of ships fixed by the bill
included the fleet then actually in commission, notwithstanding its
material being already old and far surpassed by contemporary types.
In other foreign navies the extraordinary rapidity with which
improvements were introduced in types of battleships, armaments,
and armor made the fleet in commission obsolete before the building
programme providing additions to it was half finished.

The obsolete fleet had to be struck off the list, thus leaving a
gap, lowering the number of ships below the standard prescribed by
the bill. This gap was stopped by using the finished ships to
replace the obsolete ones instead of being added to them as
originally intended. Therefore, instead of steadily increasing the
standing fleet by regular additions it came to a wholesale
rebuilding of the entire German Navy. Our actual programme in
course of execution is practically only the exchange of old
material for new, but not an addition to the number of units
originally laid down by the bill of ten years ago, which is being
adhered to.

It seems to me that the main fault in the discussions going on in
the papers is the permanent ventilating of so-called two to three
or more power standard and then only exemplifying on one power,
which is invariably Germany. It is fair to suppose that each nation